

"Can We Interpret Kant as an Incompatibilist about Free Will and Moral Responsibility?"
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In this paper, I discuss Hudson's compatibilistic interpretation of Kant's theory of free will, and I sketch an alternative interpretation of my own, an incompatibilistic interpretation according to which agents *qua* noumena are responsible for the particular causal laws which determine the actions of agents *qua* phenomena. Hudson's interpretation should be attractive to philosophers who value Kant's epistemology and ethics, but insist on a deflationary reading of things in themselves. It is in an incompatibilist interpretation of Kant's theory of free will that a "positive" conception of noumena is at its most important. If a compatibilistic interpretation is acceptable, one might suppose that we can do without a "positive" conception of noumena throughout Kant's philosophy. I demonstrate, however, that there are central elements of Kant's theory of free will that cannot be accommodated within Hudson's interpretation.